New forms of local governance : a theoretical and empirical analysis of municipal corporations in Portugal by Tavares, António F. & Camões, Pedro J.
 1 
New Forms of Local Governance: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis of Municipal Corporations in Portugal 
 
ANTÓNIO F. TAVARES & PEDRO J. CAMÕES 
Department of International Relations and Public Administration,  
School of Economics and Management, University of Minho, Portugal. 
  
Correspondence Address: António Tavares, Department of International Relations and 
Public Administration, School of Economics and Management, University of Minho 
(Campus de Gualtar), 4710-057 Braga, Portugal. Tel.: +351 963 350978; fax: +351 253 
676375 Email: atavares@eeg.uminho.pt  
 
Acknowledgements 
The Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation provided financial support for this 
research. 
 
Notes on Authors 
 
António Tavares received his Ph.D. in Public Administration from the Reubin O’D. 
Askew School of Public Administration and Policy at Florida State University. He is 
currently an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations and Public 
Administration at the University of Minho, Braga, Portugal. His main research interests 
comprise topics in the fields of local government and urban politics such as service 
delivery, solid waste management, and land use management and urban growth. His 
work appeared in Policy Studies Journal, Local Government Studies, and International 
Journal of Economic Development. He has recently published an edited book, Estudo e 
Ensino da Administração Pública em Portugal, debating research and teaching of 
Public Administration in Portugal.  
 
Tel:  +351 253 604510 (ext. 5527) 
Fax: + 351 253 676375 
E-mail: atavares@eeg.uminho.pt 
 
Pedro J. Camões is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the 
University of Minho in Braga, Portugal. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from 
the University South Carolina.  His general research interests are local government and 
public budgeting and finance. Specifically, the main focus is on fiscal and political 
institutions of decentralization, namely the determinants of institutional change and 
their effects.  He published in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
Local Government Studies, and Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences. He is 
member of the Center for Research on Public Policy and Administration (NEAPP). He 
is the coordinator of a publicly funded research project on the importance of local 
accounting in the performance of municipal governments.   
  
Tel:  +351 253 604510 (ext 5521) 
Fax: + 351 253 676375 
E-mail: pedroc@eeg.uminho.pt 
 
 
 2 
 
New Forms of Local Governance: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis of Municipal Corporations in Portugal 
 
 
Abstract 
What factors influence local governments to rely on municipal corporations to 
provide public services? This article seeks to identify which factors lead local 
governments to use local corporate public sector organizations, particularly municipal 
corporations, for service delivery. Based on the ideas of the neo-institutionalism 
approach to public administration developed by Murray Horn (1995), we argue that 
local officials trade-off bureaucratic costs of in-house production with agency costs of 
external delegation to municipal corporations when deciding how to deliver local public 
services. Econometric models are employed to test this explanation for the adoption of 
municipal corporations by the 278 Portuguese local governments. The results indicate 
that organizational size, financial independency, and fiscal surplus, as well as 
ideological concerns and the activity of local interest groups, drive choices of local 
governance structures.  
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Background 
During the last decade, Portugal experienced a substantial expansion of new 
forms of local governance, mainly due to the enactment of the Municipal, 
Intermunicipal and Regional Corporations Act of 19981. According to official data, 269 
of 308 Portuguese local governments (approximately 88 per cent) have invested capital 
in public and private corporations. The increase in these forms of service delivery has 
occurred through the accelerated growth of the local corporate public sector2 
demonstrated by the increase in number of municipal corporations from 34 in 1999 to 
114 in 2001 and stock companies with connections to local governments from 143 
(1999) to 187 (2001) (Almeida 2001). 
In Portugal, it is generally accepted that these new forms of local governance are 
the result of an attempt to improve financial management, relax public procurement 
rules, and circumvent civil service laws and their implications for personnel 
management, contract agreements and organization. Rigorous controls imposed by 
national institutions such as the Accounting Court (Tribunal de Contas3), the General 
Inspection of Territorial Administration (Inspecção Geral da Administração do 
Território) and the General Inspection of Finances (Inspecção Geral de Finanças), as 
well as the requirements of civil service laws are avoided by these new forms of 
governance, even though this does not mean the complete subordination to general 
labour laws applied to the private sector (Oliveira 2001).  
Contrary to Anglo-Saxon common law, Portuguese Law separates civil service 
law (administrative law) and private labour law. While the former applies to national 
and local public administration services (direct government), the later applies to the 
private sector, government corporations, government-sponsored enterprises, and indirect 
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government. The main differences lie in the detailed procedures to be followed in 
managing human and financial resources, procurement decisions, and the degree of ex-
ante and ex-post controls. In general, administrative law requires much more 
burdensome procedures than general labour law, which contributes to explain the 
tendency to shift of services from public bureaus to municipal corporations, also known 
as public authorities in the Anglo-Saxon literature (Gulick 1947; Frant 1997; Bourdeaux 
2005). While this is an obvious reason to create municipal corporations, it does not 
explain why some directly elected mayors rely more than others in this form of indirect 
government.  
The Portuguese central government has a limited number of instruments to 
monitor the creation of local government-sponsored corporations; individual monitoring 
activities are expensive and a single monitoring strategy for all municipalities may be 
inadequate to the diversity of situations. As a result, in a situation of public monopoly, 
local elected officials are relatively free to choose the governance structure of service 
delivery that enhances political efficiency, translated in electoral gains.  
The proliferation of municipal corporations with local government capital in the 
last decade has led us to question the reasons for this significant growth. More 
specifically, we are interested in the research question suggested by Murray Horn 
(1995: 170): If the government does want to own the producer of these goods and 
services, why does it choose the local government-owned enterprise [public authority] 
form of organization rather than the bureau form? We argue that local elected 
executives trade-off bureaucratic costs of in-house production with agency costs of 
external delegation to municipal corporations when deciding the governance structure to 
deliver local public services.  
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First, we discuss the alternative institutional arrangements of public service 
provision at the disposal of local governments. Next, we briefly review the literature on 
institutional arrangements of local service provision linking it with the transaction costs 
literature. Third, we explore the motivations of local elected officials to shift the 
provision of services to public authorities by highlighting the internal costs of 
delegation to bureau civil servants. Fourth, we identify the external delegation costs 
involved in providing services using the local corporate public sector and some of the 
possible explanations for why municipalities may shy away from using these types of 
organizations for service delivery. In the fifth section we formulate our hypotheses and 
describe the variables employed in the empirical analysis conducted in section six. We 
close with a short set of conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
The Context of the Expansion of Municipal Corporations in Portugal 
Municipal corporations are set up as separate corporate entities legally distinct 
from the rest of the local government, which controls the corporation. Accordingly, they 
fit the profile defined by Stanton and Moe (2002) to describe government corporations, 
by showing high degrees of coerciveness and directness, and low degree of visibility. 
Given these features, municipal corporations are clearly distinct from government-
sponsored enterprises (Stanton and Moe 2002). 
Although municipal corporations are a relatively new form of service delivery in 
Portugal, they possess features similar to service public authorities as defined by 
Sbragia (1996). Like public authorities, Portuguese municipal corporations are single-
purpose organizations not allowed to levy taxes, rely on revenues derived from user 
fees, are governed by an appointed, rather than elected, executive board, and have 
independent corporate status (including the right to own property and the right to sue 
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and be sued) (Doig 1983; Sbragia 1996; Frant 1997; Bourdeaux 2005; Eger III 2005). 
Local government officials are responsible for appointing the members of the executive 
boards of municipal corporations. Also, unlike municipal enterprises or enterprise funds 
that may be on or off budget and may or may not be for the purpose of raising capital 
(Rubin 1988), Portuguese municipal corporations are created as completely separate 
entities from the enacting local government, even though municipal budget transfers 
may occur at times to cover shortfalls. For these reasons, what is known from the 
municipal enterprises literature (Rubin 1988; Stumm 1996) may not apply to Portuguese 
municipal corporations. Given the similarities in terms of institutional arrangement 
features, we employ the concept of service public authorities throughout the article as 
equivalent to Portuguese municipal corporations. 
Before the enactment of the Municipal, Intermunicipal and Regional 
Corporations Act of 1998, the provision of municipal level services was the 
responsibility of local officials, while the local bureaucracy was fully in-charge of the 
production activities. Upon the enactment of the legislation, elected officials began 
creating municipal corporations and delegating the task of service production to the 
executive board of the corporation. Since local executives nominate the members of the 
executive board and the majority of the capital invested in public authorities is 
municipal, elected officials retain, in practice, the responsibility for service provision4. 
Upon the formation of municipal corporations, public sector employees were 
simply transferred from the local government payroll to the municipal corporation 
payroll without changing the civil service status of the existing workforce. Hence, the 
establishment of municipal corporations was also characterized by a high degree of 
automaticity, with the production of municipal services largely remaining the 
responsibility of the same workforce (Stanton and Moe 2002).  
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The choice of municipal corporations in Portugal to provide municipal services 
is also clearly distinct from contracting out or privatization decisions. Portuguese 
municipal corporations are governance structures essentially designed to circumvent 
civil service and financial management restrictions imposed by administrative law. 
However, the decision to keep service provision under a public bureau or shift it to a 
municipal corporation can be best described as an institutional choice, since it 
constitutes a change in the rules of the game (Ostrom 1990; Clingermayer and Feiock 
2001).  
Hence, more relevant than the creation of local public sector corporations, it is 
the decision to change the rules for local service provision that matters. The focus of our 
analysis is the institutional change and the transaction costs present in the decision faced 
by local officials. The choice between the two types of institutional arrangements 
(public bureaus versus municipal corporations) is determined by the trade-off between 
the bureaucratic costs of managing internal service provision and the agency costs of 
managing municipal corporations. 
  
Institutional Arrangements and Local Service Delivery: The Literature 
 The neo-institutionalism literature explores the role played by transaction costs 
in institutional design and choice (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Goodin 1998; Horn 
1995; Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Miller 1992). At the local government level, 
empirical research employed the transaction costs framework both to explain 
contracting and sector choice decisions (Clingermayer, Feiock, and Stream 2003; 
Feiock, Clingermayer and Dasse 2003; Clingermayer and Feiock 2001; Ashton 1998; 
Nelson 1997), service delivery performance (Brown and Potoski 2003), and the choice 
of functional areas to transfer to municipal corporations (Tavares and Camões 2007). 
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The costs of direct provision of the service, the protection against uncertainty present in 
the political arena, and the protection of social values such as justice, equity, and the 
public interest have also been mentioned as factors influencing institutional choices 
(Donahue 1989; McGuire, Ohsfeldt, and Van Cott 1987; Smith 1996). 
These analyses emphasize the public-private sector choice, but neglect the 
decision to shift governance structures of local service provision within the public 
sector. Horn (1995) presents a theoretical discussion of the choice between public 
enterprises and public bureaus as alternative ways of providing government services. 
The transaction costs framework allows us to develop “…falsifiable predictions about 
institutional choice” (Horn 1995: 13), and helps clarify the choice between public 
enterprises and public bureaus. More importantly, this framework provides the tools to 
describe institutional change as the result of a political process largely dominated by 
local government officials as suppliers of formal governance structures (Alston 1996). 
Before identifying the transactions costs involved in institutional provision choice, it is 
necessary to characterize public bureaus and the different types of organizations that 
comprise the local corporate public sector so as to get a better sense of the features 
motivating the choices made by local officials.  
The institutional arrangements of public service provision are extremely diverse 
(Ostrom and Ostrom 1977; Ostrom 1983; Smith 1996; Salamon 2002). Here, our 
concern is not with contracting or privatization decisions, since these are grounded in 
different goals and decision-making processes. Our central argument is that the choice 
between public sector options is motivated by the desire to circumvent civil service and 
financial restrictions without relinquishing control over provision and production 
decisions.  
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Public bureaus are primarily tax-financed, compete with each other for budget 
allocations, and are more subject to political interference. Bureau officials and 
employees do not retain any part of surplus as personal income and, in general, revenues 
are not generated from the sale of output at a per-unit rate (Niskanen 1971). In Portugal 
bureaus are subject to administrative law, which involves strict civil service laws, public 
procurement rules, and financial management limitations. Auditing by the Accounting 
Court follows strict procedures and it occurs both ex-ante and ex-post all hiring 
decisions and most procurement and financial decisions. Administrative law applies to 
direct government, but not to indirect government, that follows standard private law.   
In contrast, municipal corporations are governed by a board presided by a CEO, 
have larger managerial discretion in administrative and human resource decisions, avoid 
limits on public borrowing, and are mainly self-financed through output sales at per-unit 
rate. Still, the distinction between public bureaus and municipal corporations is less 
clear when the later run large and persistent deficits, forcing local officials to finance 
losses with budget allocations (Horn 1995). 
In Portugal, the local corporate public sector is composed of several forms of 
public and public-private arrangements including public corporations, stock companies 
with public capital, public foundations, and cooperatives. The share of public funds 
invested by local governments varies from one form to another, but all these display at 
least fifty per cent of public capital as the initial investment. Still, the variation within 
these different governance structures is much smaller than the variation between the 
local corporate public sector organizations and the public bureau form of organization. 
The specialization of municipal governments using corporate-like forms has 
been the subject of several empirical studies over the last decade. These analyses 
concentrate on the determinants of municipal enterprises (Rubin 1988), special districts 
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(Foster 1996), and public authorities (Bourdeaux 2005). In a study of New York State 
solid waste public authorities, Carolyn Bourdeaux (2005) suggests that the determinants 
of public authorities can be divided into three groups: public finance, political 
motivations, and interjurisdictional concerns. The results of the analysis show that 
public authorities are created to circumvent debt limitations, but this is only part of the 
picture. Elected officials design institutional features of public authorities in order to 
insulate service provision from political competition.  
In order to take this argument into account, the neo-institutionalism literature 
provides an explanation for the institutional choice between bureaucratic and public 
authority service provision. This choice aims to minimize political transaction costs 
associated with service delivery, but the consequences of choice and implementation 
cannot be fully anticipated. In other words, individuals act in ways intentionally 
rational, while subjected to uncertainty (Horn 1995; Williamson 1988). One alternative 
becomes more attractive relative to the other as it increases the chances of re-election of 
local officials. To hold office, elected officials must please their constituents, while 
appointed officials require the continued support of those outside actors who appointed 
them (Bauroth 2005). The following section explores the decision by local officials to 
delegate authority as a product of the trade-off between the bureaucratic costs of 
managing service provision and the agency costs of managing municipal corporations.  
 
Delegation of Authority in Local Service Delivery: A Principal-Agent Framework 
Public provision of municipal services always involves delegation of authority. 
If a municipality produces the service directly using an in-house workforce, the 
delegation of authority is internal and the costs incurred by elected officials can be 
aggregated under the heading of bureaucratic costs associated with internal monitoring 
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of subordinate behavior. When a municipal corporation produces the service, the 
delegation of authority is external, and agency costs involved in monitoring will be 
present. Once local government officials sponsor the shift of service delivery to 
municipal corporations (solid waste collection, water supply, transit systems, parks and 
landscape maintenance, sewage collection and treatment, among many others), agency 
costs increase, essentially due to allocative inefficiencies involved in the loss of political 
control to the external provider. 
 
Bureaucratic Supply, Internal Delegation, and Decision-Making Costs 
Traditionally, local governments prefer direct production of services that the 
market is unable or unwilling to produce and/or provide. The maintenance of public 
parks, the regulation of medical drugs, the control of pollution, or road works are 
examples of services the market fails to produce in efficient quantities and that, 
therefore, become central or local government responsibility. The hierarchy, as opposed 
to the market, is more efficacious in the pursuit of these goals. 
The literature on principal-agent theory argues that the internal production of 
publicly provided services involves delegation from the mayor or municipal council to 
the bureaucrats or administrative ranks, acting as agents. Bureaucrats have a better 
understanding of the minimum cost of service production and ask for a higher budget 
than their needs – the discretionary budget (Niskanen 1971) – and can engage in on-the-
job shirking due to the lack of flexibility of civil service laws barring effective 
personnel management. These practices are the product of information asymmetry 
between elected local officials and administrative employees and result in internal 
delegation costs and inefficiencies. 
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The lack of flexibility of civil service law in Portugal is usually mentioned as an 
obstacle to efficient management. This rigidity is justified as a means to guarantee the 
continuity and political neutrality of public servants, even if it entails inefficient 
behaviour. The decision to change institutional arrangements from bureaus to municipal 
corporations can be partly explained by the minimization of decision-making costs, 
defined as the time and effort it takes local officials to reach an agreement or decision. 
As an example, hiring and firing public sector employees under civil service laws is 
much more cumbersome than under general labour laws that apply to all private as well 
as municipal corporations.  
Decision-making costs will be lower if municipal corporations, rather than 
bureaus, are in charge of local service provision because corporations are agents 
independent from political intrusion in terms of financial budgeting rules, procurement 
laws, and human resource management. In general, municipal corporations also 
guarantee the visibility of service quantity and quality that can be adequately monitored 
by consumers due to the link between service and rate. In turn, this protects local 
taxpayers from fiscal risks associated with inefficient service provision by bureaus and 
explains why local officials may prefer municipal corporations in a context of higher tax 
burdens. 
As the number and diversity of services to be provided increases, decision-
making costs are likely to rise sharply due to the multiplication of the number of 
citizens as well as organizational departments and bureau employees. The increased 
pressure exerted over local officials due to conflicting interests between stakeholders 
will lead to a shift in institutional arrangement. Thus, it is not surprising that local 
officials frequently opt for municipal corporations to deliver local services, in order to 
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escape budget limitations (Aharoni 1986) and avoid responsibility for solving difficult 
problems (Tierney 1984). 
Municipal corporations also help to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies because 
they insulate the provision of specific services from the competition for resources and 
budgets, reduce the number of transfers between services, and stimulate each 
corporation to search for own revenues. In addition, local bureaucracies are much more 
subjected to inefficiencies than municipal corporations because local officials have to 
periodically stand for election. 
There are, of course, allocative inefficiencies associated with the creation of 
these entities, mainly as a result of the loss of control by local officials, resulting in 
lower response to voter’s preferences (Frant 1996). After discussing bureaucratic costs 
and productive inefficiencies present in local bureaus, we now turn to allocative 
inefficiencies associated with municipal corporations. 
 
External Service Delivery, Allocative Inefficiency and Agency Costs 
The shift in service delivery rules to a municipal corporation is equivalent to a 
delegation of authority, entailing both economic and political efficiency arguments. 
Economically, service delivery by municipal corporations is likely to produce savings 
and improve efficiency in service delivery. When the delegation is made to a municipal 
corporation, administrative and civil service rules and regulations no longer apply and 
the new governance structure is characterized by significant managerial discretion. A 
recent study of the impact of corporatization of public agencies in Canada shows 
positive effects of corporatization on output and revenues, revenues-to-expenditure 
coverage, cost efficiency, and employee productivity (Bilodeau, Laurin, and Vining 
2007).   
 14 
The creation of municipal corporations requires the authorization of the 
municipal council and is subjected to ex-post control by the Accounting Court. Other 
than these requirements, all Portuguese municipal corporations enjoy high flexibility of 
organization, have greater discretion to enter in contracts with other public or private 
organizations, and face less strict hiring and firing rules, absence of ex-ante 
procurement controls, and the possibility to incur debt without strict legal limitations 
faced by local governments. Additionally, municipal corporations can enter into 
agreements with other municipalities to expand service areas and appropriate scale 
economies. As single-purpose organizations, corporations explore specialization gains 
through better production technology, highly skilled workforce, and financial 
investments. Municipal corporations also constitute an alternative for municipalities to 
avoid situations where the market fails, such as the outsourcing of companies in 
monopolist or oligopolist markets, which is likely to be the case in industries providing 
services where local government-sponsored corporations usually operate, such as water 
supply, transportation, and social/affordable housing (Horn 1995). 
Contrary to public bureaus, the absence of reelection incentives reduces the 
likelihood that public authorities are used by elected officials as tools for political 
advantage, increasing productive efficiency and reducing opportunistic behaviour 
(Clingermayer, Feiock, and Stream 2003). However, the same institutional structure that 
insulates management decisions from unduly political interference also generates loss of 
control over service provision and an increase in agency costs. The use of municipal 
corporations in service delivery poses questions regarding the definition and protection 
of public purpose, since the lines of accountability become less clear to citizens and 
voters (Salamon 2002; Koppell 2003; Skelcher 2006).  
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Hence, agency costs will be higher for municipal corporations because these 
institutional arrangements are less politically responsive than public bureaus. Service 
delivery decisions are made by politically appointed officials that have incentives to 
signal their abilities as managers to private sector employment opportunities (Horn 
1995). In Portugal, the relative independence of municipal corporations is even more 
likely to involve increased agency costs for elected officials, since there is very limited 
to no competition for service delivery at the local level. In addition, delegating service 
delivery responsibilities to municipal corporations creates path dependency problems, 
because this decision involves loosening civil service constraints and increasing 
financial management discretion. Loss of political control and decrease in democratic 
accountability become acceptable only if internal delegation costs and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies are significant.  
Of course, in some situations, political insulation and blurry accountability lines 
can actually be useful in terms of political preferences (Moe 1984; 1990). Political 
efficiency, measured in terms of the probability of re-election of local officials, can be 
reached whenever elected executives foresee problems in service delivery. In these 
cases, service transfers can shield the executive from unpopular decisions such as 
increases in user fees, service disruptions, or other undesirable events related with 
service performance. After the 1998 Law, municipal corporations boomed in Portugal 
because local officials recognized this new governance structure as an opportunity for 
economic benefit, as well as political gain. 
  
Hypotheses and Variables 
The previous section shows that the principal-agent framework enables us to 
contextualize service delivery choices in Portuguese municipalities. Theoretically, it 
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would be possible for municipalities to retain internal control over all public service 
production. However, resource and organizational limitations entailing significant 
bureaucratic costs force delegation of activities to a greater or lesser extent to external 
providers. The size of the local bureaucracy (Bureaucracy) is a reliable indicator of the 
amount of decision-making costs faced by local officials. If the number of local 
government employees is large, bureaucratic costs will be high, leading local officials to 
transfer service delivery to municipal corporations. The formation of single-purpose 
municipal corporations is likely to reduce bureaucratic costs generated by excessive 
organizational complexity and size of traditional municipal services. 
 
H1: The size of the local bureaucracy is positively associated with the creation 
of municipal corporations. 
 
Portuguese municipalities can be highly fragmented, since they face organized 
local interests in each parish. The parish is the smallest territorial unit of self-
government in Portugal, with a low number of competences and heavily financially 
dependent on the municipal government. The number of parishes per municipality 
varies from one to 89. This type of fragmentation at the municipal level is likely to 
increase the number of municipal corporations because each parish operates as an 
interest group, lobbying the municipal government for more and better services. In 
municipalities with many parishes competing for limited budgets, elected officials face 
tremendous decision-making costs, because they have to deal with these interest group 
pressures placed on in-house bureaucracies. 
The number of parishes is a good proxy for preference heterogeneity at the local 
level. Single-purpose municipal corporations may be better equipped to deal with 
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heterogeneous service demands and preferences (Foster 1996; Nelson 1997). The 
heterogeneity of community preferences increases internal delegation costs and 
generates incentives to transfer services to a separate entity, more politically insulated 
from the elected executive. Since municipal corporations are created as single-purpose 
entities they tend to possess better production technology, highly skilled workforce, and 
financial resources required to respond more adequately to preference diversity. Hence, 
we expect that: 
 
H2: Local governments with a large number of parishes will be more inclined to 
create municipal corporations in order to respond to increased interest group 
competition. 
 
In municipalities characterized by large population growth, the need for 
delegation will be higher, not only because the pressures for the municipality to provide 
a larger amount and diversity of services is higher, but also because interest groups will 
be more active and in larger number in calling for specific services. The motivation 
behind this option of service delivery is that when public service demand increases, the 
response of the municipality may become inadequate due to the size and complexity of 
internal organization. The creation of municipal corporations produces economies of 
scale for some services, hence ensuring a more efficient response to service needs 
(Tavares and Camões 2007). Even though economic efficiency may not be the prime 
target of elected politicians, transferring services to municipal corporations is politically 
desirable. If performance improves as a result of the transfer, politicians can claim 
credit. If performance declines, elected officials are more insulated from criticism 
because the chain of accountability is less clear for voters to follow. Population growth 
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(Popgrowth) is measured as the rate of municipal population change over the last two 
Censuses (1991-2001).  
 
H3: Local governments facing large population growth are expected to create 
more municipal corporations in response to an increase in the heterogeneity of 
community preferences. 
 
In Portugal, local revenues consist of two large parcels: local taxes and central 
government grants. The financial situation faced by local governments influences the 
decision to create municipal corporations. Contrary to the outsourcing literature (Ferris 
1986; Ferris and Grady 1991; Hodge 2000; however see Pallesen (2004) for the Danish 
experience), we have two reasons to believe that municipal governments are more likely 
to transfer service delivery to municipal corporations when experiencing good financial 
health. First, since many of the services transferred involve user fees5, these revenues 
are essential in situations of heavy local government dependency on central government 
grants, so that it would be politically unwise to transfer services to a separate entity. 
Second, strong local finances allow elected officials to deal with external costs of 
delegation associated with transferring services to municipal corporations and help 
secure against eventual losses that can occur if these go bankrupt. When facing a strong 
reliance on central government grants, local government officials experience high 
agency costs involved in relinquishing control over user fees, making them more likely 
to opt for public bureau service delivery. Financial dependency (FinDep) from the 
central government is the proportion of central government grants over total municipal 
revenues. 
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H4: Local governments facing significant financial dependency are less likely to 
rely on municipal corporations for service delivery. 
 
Rubin (1988) has argued that, when financial conditions are adverse (high 
deficits), municipalities avoid the creation of municipal enterprises, apparently because 
these drain resources from the general fund. In contrast, the empirical literature on 
contracting suggests that fiscal stress increases contracting-out for service delivery with 
private organizations (Ferris 1986; Ferris and Grady 1991; Hodge 2000), but no studies 
have explored the link between local deficits and the formation of public authorities (see 
Bourdeaux). In order to capture financial hardship in municipal budgets, we employ the 
total deficit (Def), measured as the difference between total revenues and total 
expenditures and, consistently with H4 concerning financial dependency, suggest the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H5: Municipalities with larger local deficits create less municipal corporations, 
since local governments will be pressed for revenues from user fees and will not 
relinquish these greatly needed resources. 
 
Local governments where local taxes (Taxpc) represent a larger share of total 
revenues are expected to display larger numbers of municipal corporations. The reason 
is obvious: when the tax burden is already high, the transfer of services involving user 
fees to municipal corporations allows local government officials to shift blame to the 
corporation. Any increases in user fees for water supply, garbage disposal, among other 
services, are less likely to affect local politicians’ chances at reelection because 
municipal corporations operate as a shield to blur the chain of accountability for 
 20 
ratepayers. Indirectly, this corresponds to a comparative increase in internal costs of 
delegation, since the external option becomes more politically attractive. Hence, we 
expect that: 
 
H6: Elected officials in communities where local taxes represent a larger 
proportion of total revenues are more likely to create municipal corporations. 
 
The creation of municipal corporations can also be driven by an ideological 
orientation of municipal service delivery. The most representative political parties in 
Portugal cover the political spectrum from the left to the right and it is expected that 
right-leaning municipal governments will be more supportive of service transfers to 
municipal corporations. The four major parties in the Portuguese political system are the 
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), coded “0” on the left, the Socialist Party, coded 
“1” center-left, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), coded “2”, center-right, and the 
Christian-Democratic Party/Popular Party, coded “3” on the right. Parties close to the 
center of the political spectrum have alternated in the National Government for the last 
22 years and control about 82,7 per cent of all municipal governments. 
Although right-leaning parties are inclined to favour privatisation or contracting 
out to private firms to deliver municipal services, they may not be able to convince the 
electorate to accept such a radical solution, given the Portuguese tradition of public 
bureaucratic production and provision of municipal services. In this context, municipal 
corporations are a middle of the road strategy to move municipalities away from in-
house production (Leavitt and Morris 2004). 
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H7: Municipalities controlled by right or right-leaning parties are more likely to 
create municipal corporations. 
 
In addition to the party ideology measure (PartyId), we employ a dichotomous 
variable (Majority) identifying a single party majority in the executive body of the 
municipality. It is expected that the presence of a majority will increase the number of 
municipal corporations, essentially because decision-making costs in the executive body 
are substantially reduced (Horn 1995). When a single party holds the majority, veto 
points in the executive are absent and decisions are not constrained by the opposing 
parties. In this context, it is more likely that delegation to the local corporate public 
sector will occur. 
 
H8: The presence of a single party majority in the executive body of the 
municipality increases the likelihood of creation of municipal corporations. 
 
The index of social development (ISD) is included as a control variable for the 
socio-economic conditions prevailing in the municipality. The ISD is an equal weight 
formula composed by three indicators: expected life at birth index, educational level 
index, and living conditions index (electrical power, water, and wastewater supply from 
public sources). The area of the municipality (Area) is measured in squared kilometres 
and is used as a control for our fragmentation variable. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] 
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Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses and variables described above and their 
expected effects on the creation of municipal corporations.  It also presents a brief 
definition and measurement of each variable, as well as the data source. Table 2 shows 
the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis of the hypotheses presented in the previous section 
involves the use of two different but related dependent variables. The first is the total 
number of the various corporate public sector organizations (with more than fifty per 
cent of public capital) created in the 1999-2002 period. As argued previously, the 
structural variation within the corporate public sector is much smaller than the variation 
between these governance structures and public bureaus, which justifies treating these 
organizations additively as a count variable. The second dependent variable (MunCorp) 
is a dichotomous variable identifying whether or not the municipal government 
transferred at least one service to a municipal corporation. Whereas the first dependent 
variable reflects the intensity of choice, the second tests local officials’ willingness to 
adopt a governance structure different from the traditional bureau form.   
In the first analysis, we employ a Poisson regression model. This is the 
appropriate estimation technique to treat event counts, since the major assumption is 
that the conditional mean of the distribution equals the conditional variance 
(equidispersion). However, we are aware that, more often than not, the variance exceeds 
the mean (overdispersion) so that the Poisson model is no longer adequate.  Then, the 
first step in determining the appropriateness of this model is to test for overdispersion 
(Long 1997; Green 2003). The goodness-of-fit χ2 test does not allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the data are Poisson distributed, so a Poisson regression model is used in 
the estimation. The Poisson regression results are presented in Table 3.  
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[Insert Table 3] 
 
The likelihood ratio test based on a chi-square distribution compares the log 
likelihood of the unconstrained model with the log likelihood of a model only with the 
constant. If the constraint significantly reduces the likelihood, the null hypothesis is 
rejected (Long 1997). The likelihood ratio for this model is statistically significant 
providing the indication that the full model is adequate. The pseudo-R2 should be 
carefully interpreted, since the usual interpretation – the proportion of the variation in 
the dependent variable explained by the independent variables – is not fully satisfactory. 
Long (1997) advises that large values are, obviously, better than lower values, but there 
is no clear cut criterion to judge the value of 23,3 per cent obtained for our estimated 
model.  
In more substantive terms, the results provide general support for the hypotheses 
we developed in the previous sections. Concerning the political variables, the ideology 
of the party governing the municipality matters. The analysis supports the idea that a 
right-leaning composition of the local council increases the probability of using a larger 
number of corporate public sector governance structures. Therefore, we have reason to 
argue that rightist parties use public municipal corporations as a middle road strategy to 
move away from in-house production6.    
Turning to hypotheses essentially derived from the transaction costs approach, 
the hypothesis regarding the effect of internal delegation costs is strongly supported. 
This means that as organizational complexity increases (hierarchical levels and number 
of actors) so do the benefits of turning to municipal corporations and other CPS 
governance structures.   
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The variable measuring the number of parishes in the municipality is also 
supported, which suggests that more fragmentation means more interest groups 
lobbying the municipal government for more and better services. In this sense, the 
obvious rational strategy is to rely on organizational structures that are, in fact, much 
more insulated from these political demands.  
 The three public finance variables are supported with high statistical 
significance and virtually robust to every modelling specification. Budgetary limitations 
are an evident concern in the decision. Fiscal crises (budgetary deficits) constrain local 
decision-makers to rely more on in-house, thus more controllable, delivery of local 
public services. In the same way, tax limitations and financial dependency concerns also 
seem to influence local governance choices. The more the municipalities are able to 
raise own sources of financing through local taxation – and, symmetrically, the less they 
are financially dependent – the more they rely on alternative organizational structures 
for delivering services.     
To advance a step further, Table 4 shows the computation of what Scott Long 
(1997) calls factor changes. They are derived from the Poisson regression model shown 
in Table 3. Simply put, a factor change means that, holding all variables constant, for a 
unit change in a given independent variable Xk, the output count changes by a factor of 
exp(Bk) (Long 1997, 225). This factor has an important advantage when it comes to 
interpreting the results. Contrary to what happens with the standard Poisson 
coefficients, the factor changes do not depend on the level of the variable of interest or 
all other variables in the model.     
 
[Insert Table 4] 
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To illustrate, the factor change attached to the variable measuring party ideology 
is 1.1495. This means that a change in the party securing local power to the party 
immediately on its right is expected to increase, on average, the number of corporate 
public sector organizations by 14.95 per cent. Thus, the effect is strong and uniform for 
the entire ideological spectrum.  Similarly, holding all other variables constant, having 
one more parish in a municipality implies having about 1.13 per cent more corporate 
organizations in that given municipality. It should also be obvious that a factor change 
of 0.24 of the financial dependency variable means a decrease. On average, it means the 
creation of less 76 per cent corporate organizations for each unit increase in that 
variable.  
Turning to the second dependent variable, the results are less supportive of the 
suggested hypotheses. Recall that this is a dichotomous variable to measure the mere 
choice to transfer service delivery to at least one municipal corporation in a given local 
government. As we saw in the previous sections, this type of organization has some 
common characteristics with all other corporate public sector organizations, such as that 
they are governed by a board presided by a CEO, have larger managerial discretion in 
administrative and personnel decisions, avoid limits on public borrowing, and are 
mainly self-financed.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The results presented in Table 5 show, nevertheless, two important regularities. 
The hypothesis concerning the relevance of internal delegation costs is, again, strongly 
supported. More importantly, these results are robust to many different specifications of 
the model7 and dependent variables collected from different sources. This means that 
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organizational complexity (hierarchical levels and number of actors) is a strong 
determinant in the decision to rely on municipal corporations for service provision.   
The second regularity relates to the number of parishes, seen as pressure groups 
demanding for more services to be delivered. Since it is also a good proxy for the 
heterogeneity of preferences at the local level, our results confirm prior finings that 
specialized municipal corporations may be better equipped to deal with heterogeneous 
service demands and preferences (Foster 1996; Nelson 1997).  
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
The large number of municipal corporations and corporate-like organizations 
justifies an inquiry to the causes of local government service delivery transfers to these 
governance structures. The different socio-economic and political characteristics of 
Portuguese local governments are relevant to explain the reasons for the delegation of 
authority from the municipalities to a set of corporate public sector organizations rather 
than in-house production. 
The size of the municipal government’s in-house production services generates 
high internal delegation costs, due to excessive centralization of authority. Delegation 
costs are also present in municipal corporations, but the smaller size and lower 
complexity makes these costs more manageable at this level. Then, it seems clear that, 
when size and complexity of internal organization become a problem, local 
governments opt for a specialized organization for service delivery. As the empirical 
analysis has shown, the heterogeneity of preferences of local citizens is an additional 
source of pressure for the creation of municipal corporations. 
Whereas this work is concerned with decision-making from the local officials’ 
perspective, the next step in this research agenda is to investigate the municipal 
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corporations themselves. Municipal corporations are separate organizations, even from 
a legal standpoint. Future work will further explore these single-purpose organizations 
by looking at their service delivery activities, personnel, and financial status. 
 
NOTES 
1. Portuguese municipal corporations have many institutional features in common with 
what the Anglo-Saxon literature identifies as public authorities (Gulick 1947; Sbragia 
1996; Frant 1997; Bourdeaux 2005). Throughout this article we employ the concepts 
interchangeably. 
2. The local corporate public sector includes all forms of organizations involving a 
majority of public capital, namely municipal corporations, stock companies, public 
foundations, and cooperatives. 
3. Judicial branch organization that inspects and evaluates the legality and conformity of 
public budgeting and spending practices producing decisions valid for all public 
organizations. 
4. The provision choice relates to the decisions about what services to provide, quality 
standards of those services, and the criteria for raising revenue. Production, on the other 
hand, refers to the technical aspects of arranging resources to manufacture a product or 
deliver a service (Parks and Oakerson 1989). 
5. The most prevalent are solid waste, water supply, public parking, and affordable 
housing. 
6. We also tested this hypothesis using a set of three dummy variables representing the 
four political parties. The results are consistent with the findings reported here. 
7. The different specifications were not included here due to space limitations but will 
be made available upon request to the authors. 
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TABLE 1 – VARIABLES DESCRIPTION, EXPECTED SIGNS, AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Expected Sign Source 
CPS Dependent Variable; the number of Corporate 
Public Sector Organizations with more than 50 
per cent of public capital created by 2001.  
 
 
Almeida (2001) 
MunCorp Dependent Variable; Dichotomous variable to 
measure the choice to create Municipal 
Corporations only. 1 if one or more corporations 
were created and 0 if none was created. 
 Direct Survey 
to 
Municipalities 
PartyId Left-right ideological measure of the party 
securing the majority of the local council; PCP 
(left) coded as 0, PS (center-left) coded 1, PSD 
(center-right) coded 2, and PP (right) coded as 3. 
 
+ 
DGAL (2001) 
Majority Dummy variable which takes the value of “1” 
when the winning party has the majority of seats 
in the executive body. “0” otherwise.   
+ DGAL (2001) 
Bureaucracy The number of employees of the in-house 
municipal organization.  
+ 
 
Direct Survey 
to 
Municipalities 
Parishes Number of Parishes in the municipality.  + DGAL (2001) 
PopGrowth  Variation in the population between two census.  + DGAL (2001) 
Area Area in squared kilometers + DGAL (2001) 
ISD Index of social development as measured by 
Portuguese government.  
+ DGAL (2001) 
Taxpc Local taxes per capita.  + DGAL (2001) 
Def Total local budgetary balance (a negative number 
is a deficit).  
+ DGAL (2001) 
FinDep Financial dependency, that is, the proportion of 
central government grants in total local revenues.  
- DGAL (2001) 
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TABLE 2 – SUMMARY OF THE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CPS 278 2.9353 2.7592 0 22 
MunCorp 278 .3273 .4701 0 1 
PartyId 278 1.2986 .7510 0 3 
Majority  278 .8921 .3108 0 1 
Bureaucracy 276 399.5797 714.6057 46 10306 
Parishes 278 14.5216 12.7717 1 89 
PopGrowth 278 .8000 12.2127 -19.22 78.06 
Area 278 319.0423 283.0178 7 1721 
ISD 278 .8456 .0457 .6392 .9347 
Taxpc 278 12.3871 13.0934 .3586 157.4417 
Def 278 - 64358.09 794486.4 - 1.28e+7 831195 
FinDep 278 0.4556 0.1705 .1007 .903 
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TABLE 3 – RESULTS OF THE POISSON REGRESSION MODEL 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
PartyId .1396*** .0534 
Majority  .0226 .1130 
Bureaucracy .0004*** .0001 
Parishes .0112*** .0026 
PopGrowth .0025 .0031 
Area .0002 .0002 
ISD .8872 1.3151 
Taxpc .0099*** .0024 
Def 2.79e-07*** 5.05e-08 
FinDep -1.4096*** .3531 
Const .0954 1.2206 
   
Num Obs.  276  
LR chi2 (10) 304.03  
Prob > chi2 .0000  
Pseudo R2 .2338  
Log-L -498.2765  
  *** p > .01. 
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TABLE 4 – FACTOR CHANGES OF THE POISSON REGRESSION MODEL 
Variable Factors Std. Err. 
PartyId 1.1495 .0614 
Majority  1.0228 .1156 
Bureaucracy 1.0004 .0001 
Parishes 1.0113 .0025 
PopGrowth 1.0025 .0031 
Area 1.0002 .0002 
ISD 2.4284 3.1936 
Taxpc 1.0099 .0024 
Def 1 5.05e-08 
FinDep 0.2442 .0862 
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TABLE 5 – RESULTS OF THE LOGIT REGRESSION MODEL 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
PartyId .0322 .2136 
Majority  .9068* .5442 
Bureaucracy .0016** .0007 
Parishes .0254** .0129 
PopGrowth -.0036 .0177 
Area .0013** .0006 
ISD 7.1952 5.1918 
Taxpc .0156 .0139 
Def -1.62e-07 7.28e-07 
FinDep -.4144 1.5845 
Const -9.0835* 4.8825 
   
Num Obs.  276  
LR chi2 (10) 55.69  
Prob > chi2 .0000  
Pseudo R2 .1591  
Log-L -147.1333  
  ** p > .05; * p > .1. 
 
 
 
   
 
